One of the more controversial topics concerning the Supreme Court is how attuned justices should be to public opinion. An even more fundamental question, however, is how closely public opinion matches the Supreme Court’s decisions.
The Marquette Law School Poll, which I direct, conducts national polls on just that question (among many other topics). Specifically, we take six polls each year that track approval of the court and ask for the public’s view on the outcome of pending cases.
In this article, I focus on the public’s opinion of six significant cases before they were decided by the court late in the term, and one earlier ruling for which opinion was measured after the decision. Based on our polling, which was conducted in April and May, the public concurred in part and dissented in part with the outcomes of the Supreme Court’s major decisions this term. In four of six of these, the public was on board with the court’s rulings: birthright citizenship, late-arriving ballots, the removal of a Federal Reserve governor, and state laws limiting participation of transgender athletes. In an earlier case, tariffs, the public also agreed with the outcome, although this was measured after the court’s ruling. But the public disagreed, strongly, on the removal of heads of independent agencies and the ability of political parties to coordinate with candidates’ campaigns.
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First, as should not come as a surprise, the public does not – with extraordinarily rare exceptions – read the Supreme Court briefs or its decisions, study the legal reasoning therein, and reach a conclusion. Rather, as with the case of congressional legislation and presidential executive orders, the public typically develops an idea of what the outcomes are as described in the media and then decides whether they favor or oppose those outcomes. Just as elected officials are judged on incomplete information and hazy details, so the public comes to opinions about the court based on such rough judgments. Given the nature of the judiciary, the court is, of course, shielded from those rough judgments in a way elected officials are not. Still, opinion of the court and its decisions matter for confidence in the institution and may bring pressure on elected officials responsible for nominations and confirmations. In the rare cases of extremely salient decisions, reaction to the court can also influence voting in elections, as in the case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.
Second, perhaps again unsurprisingly, partisan lenses strongly color the public’s perception of the court, with, for example, 45% of Republicans saying the court sides with the Trump administration almost always or most of the time, and 55% saying only some of the time or never. In contrast, 79% of Democrats say the court favors the administration always or most of the time, while 21% say this happens only some of the time or never.
Despite a slight majority of Republicans saying the court has sided with the Trump administration only some of the time or less, 76% of Republicans approved of the way the Supreme Court was handling its job in May. By contrast, only 20% of Democrats approved, as did 39% of independents. (Of all adults, 46% approved of the court and 54% disapproved.)
As for the cases themselves:
- In Trump v. Barbara, in which the court struck President Donald Trump’s order seeking to end birthright citizenship, 68% of adults agreed with the outcome; 43% of Republicans, 71% of independents, and 91% of Democrats.
- In Trump v. Cook, in which the court prevented the president from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook, 66% of adults agreed with the outcome; 40% of Republicans, 68% of independents, and 92% of Democrats.
- In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, in which the court struck Trump’s imposition of tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 66% of adults agreed with the outcome; 92% of Democrats, 73% of independents, and 39% of Republicans.
- In West Virginia v. B.P.J./Little v. Hecox, in which the court ruled that states can ban transgender females from girl’s and women’s school sports, 63% of adults agreed with the outcome; 49% of Democrats, 53% of independents, and 81% of Republicans.
- In Watson v. Republican National Committee, in which the court ruled that states may have laws allowing the counting of late-arriving mail-in ballots, 56% of adults agreed with the outcome; 81% of Democrats, 54% of independents, and 32% of Republicans.
- In Trump v. Slaughter, in which the court ruled that the president may remove the heads of independent agencies, 27% of adults agreed with the outcome; 46% of Republicans, 28% of independents, and 7% of Democrats.
- In National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission, in which the court ruled that restrictions on a political party’s spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates violated the First Amendment, 26% agreed with the outcome; 25% of Republicans, 36% of independents, and 22% of Democrats.
Based on this, there was little separation in the size of the nearly two-thirds majority in agreement with the court on birthright citizenship, the removal of a Federal Reserve governor, and tariffs. Agreement was also high on laws restricting participation of transgender athletes and allowing for late-arriving mail-in ballots to be counted. Where the public strongly disagreed with the court was in the removal of heads of independent agencies, where only 27% agreed with the outcome, and on allowing political parties to coordinate with candidates in campaigns, with 26% in agreement with the decision.
Some of these numbers can be explained by the partisanship referenced earlier. In the 2025-26 term, the Trump administration was a party to a large number of cases, both on the merits and the interim dockets, and in many of those cases the gap between Republicans and Democrats was significant: over 30% in every case covered except for campaign finance, where it was a mere 3%.
Public agreement with the outcomes of cases (among adults)
Marquette Law School Poll national survey, May 20-26, 2026 for all cases except Learning Resources which was April 8-16, 2026. Note that partisan gap is the absolute value of the difference between Republican and Democratic agreement with the outcome.
This all reinforces that citizens who view the court with little or no legal background structure their preferences over outcomes of cases in much the same way they structure views of proposed legislation or presidential policy initiatives. To do so they rely on the media for information and partisanship to guide their views. Where cases tap issues of high salience and close connection to presidential policies (such as birthright citizenship or tariffs), the partisan structuring is stronger; for cases without clear partisan cues (such as campaign finance), opinion is less structured and polarization can largely disappear.
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The bottom line: The court ended the October Term 2025 with decisions in line with public opinion on four of six late decisions, plus majority agreement on the earlier tariffs case. This shows a public generally, though not completely, aligned with the Supreme’s decision-making – at least in some of the major merits cases. Whether this will lead to an increase in approval of the court itself, and whether the public shifts its views in the aftermath of the decisions, awaits the results of our next survey.
The full survey instrument, results, and methodology for the May survey can be found here. The results for April can be found here.
